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 Philosophical study of the growth of mathematics looks to history rather than 
formal logic.  This is not merely because immature knowledge tends to be 
conceptually unclear and therefore unsuitable for formalisation.  Indeed, a field of 
mathematical research could be immature and yet be populated by perfectly clear and 
fully-formalised mathematics.  The point, rather, is that the process through which 
mathematics develops evades formalisation, even if the mathematics itself does not.  
Thus history, which studies processes rather than objects and their relations, is the 
appropriate tool.  Moreover, historical case-studies can alleviate the worry that 
philosophers have directed almost all of their attention at the ‘foundational’ sub-
disciplines of logic and set-theory, leaving the rest of mathematics neglected.  (In 
practice, philosophical attention to the history of mathematics tends to concentrate on 
a few favoured topics, so the increase in scope is not as great as might have been 
hoped). 
Philosophical interest in the growth of mathematics has been rising in recent 
decades, facilitated and inspired by the emergence of university departments and 
journals devoted to the history and philosophy of science.  Nevertheless this remains a 
small field, constrained by the difficulty of interdisciplinary research and a shortage 
of suitable journals in which to publish.  Consequently, work in this area has been 
sporadic and of mixed quality.  This collection of high-quality philosophical and 
historical essays is, therefore, timely.  Indeed, Emily Grosholz, in her editorial 
introduction, makes a stronger claim than this: the established tradition in the 
philosophy of mathematics has, she says, been falling into crisis.  The use of formal 
logic to investigate the nature and foundations of mathematical knowledge “has 
exhausted many of its original possibilities and failed to attract renewed support from 
working mathematicians” (p. xii). Increasing numbers of young philosophers study 
mathematics through its history rather than with formal logic (though this increase 
starts, it must be said, from a low base).  Normative philosophy of science needed 
Kuhn to rouse it from its ahistorical slumbers.  According to Grosholz, the philosophy 
of mathematics is on the verge of a similar (though, let us hope, less rude) awakening.  
Fortunately we do not need to evaluate this stronger claim to see the worth of this 
collection. 
Multi-author volumes, at their worst, can be no more than a loose collection of 
quite disparate papers.  Editors often seem to have persuaded their authors to 
contribute by offering them a licence to interpret the title of the collection however 
they wish.   The list of contributors to a collection too often reads like an informal 
meeting of the editor’s academic chums—understandably, for who else can one ask to 
donate a paper to yet another anthology?  Or, if the authors are diverse, the literature 
they address may not be.  But this book suffers none of these defects. 
The structure of the collection no doubt reflects the organisation of the 
conference that gave rise to it.  The contents are divided first into three parts.  Part 
One, consisting of eleven essays, is misleadingly titled ‘The Question of Empiricism’.  
In fact (with the exception of a paper on empiricist philosophy of mathematics by 
Donald Gillies) empiricism has little to do with it.  The sub-title makes this clear: ‘The 
role of scientific theory and empirical fact in the growth of mathematical knowledge’.  
Part Two (also eleven essays) is called ‘The Question of Formalism: the role of 
abstraction, analysis and axiomatisation in the growth of mathematical knowledge’.  
Part Three (six essays) is ‘The Question of Progress: criteria for the characterisation 
of progress in mathematical knowledge’. 
Grosholz, in her editorial introduction, explains that each of the first two parts 
consists of four philosophical essays, each of which is followed by related historical 
case studies.  On the face of it this organisation suggests a simple model of the 
relationship between history and philosophy, in which general philosophical theses 
are opposed with counterexamples drawn from history.  In other words: philosophy 
proposes, history disposes.  The first two discussions do indeed have that form.  
Jaakko Hintikka and Donald Gillies offer philosophical views of mathematics that are, 
respectively, inductivist and empiricist.  These then suffer severe, perhaps fatal, 
criticism in the form of counterexamples offered by historians Michael Mahoney and 
Ivo Schneider.  Fortunately, this dispiriting pattern does not persist beyond the first 
two discussions.  This may be because most of the other philosophers in the collection 
are not so heavily burdened with general philosophical views to which their 
ruminations on mathematics must conform.  Elsewhere in the collection, historians 
use their grasp of detail to illustrate or qualify philosophical proposals that are 
historically sensitive to begin with.  Often the role of the historical case-studies is 
simply to balance the abstraction of philosophy with a reminder of the richness of the 
historical record. 
The division into three parts breaks down rather—for example, Herbert 
Breger, Grosholz’s co-editor, contributes a paper called ‘ Tacit Knowledge and 
Mathematical Progress’.  In it he argues that formalisation often articulates a 
previously tacit feeling for the domain in question.  Recognition of this tacit grasp of 
the subject-matter may remove the appearance of arbitrariness or magic that might 
otherwise attach to a formalising move.  In this sense, formalisation may represent 
progress in knowledge rather than the mere proliferation of systems.  Breger’s paper 
sits in Part Two (‘The Question of Formalism’), but much of the subsequent 
discussion considers the nature of progress in mathematics, and might just as well 
occur in Part Three.  The next discussion starts with Hourya Benis-Sinaceur’s paper 
‘The Nature of Progress in Mathematics: The Significance of Analogy’.  This occurs 
in Part Two because it argues that “model theory has transformed logic into an art of 
invention” (p. 291), and is therefore concerned with the heuristic benefits of a certain 
sort of formalisation.  Nevertheless, this paper (and the subsequent discussion) is also 
about progress, and could have appeared in Part Three.  Therefore, the division 
between parts Two and Three is almost arbitrary.  The editors would no doubt reply 
that any division of a field of enquiry into topics must allow some overlap.  However, 
this project seems to have developed its own shape, different from the structure that 
the editors originally planned for it.  It is a pity (but by no means a fatal flaw) that the 
editors did not re-organise the book to reflect this evolution. 
The contributors are drawn from twelve countries and include many famous 
names.  The historical cases are almost all found in modern (that is to say, post-
renaissance) European mathematics (though there is some brief discussion of ancient 
Greek and Chinese mathematics).  This apparent narrowness is defensible because 
contemporary mathematics is almost all based on the European tradition.  Examples 
drawn from medieval Indian mathematics or Japanese temple geometry would score 
points for cultural diversity without adding anything to our philosophical 
understanding of the mathematics that matters to us here and now.  Moreover, the 
range of examples within the modern European tradition is broad.  The history of 
analysis does not dominate, as one might have feared. 
 The dust-jacket announces that this book is “inspired” by Hilbert, 
Wittgenstein, Cavaillès and Lakatos.  Fortunately, this inspiration is indirect and not 
at all doctrinaire.  No-one sets out to prove that any of these luminaries was simply 
right about mathematics.  Indeed, Wittgenstein, Cavaillès and Lakatos are hardly 
mentioned at all.  Their contribution is, presumably, to draw philosophical attention to 
the history and practice of mathematical research.  Having done so, they can depart 
the scene.  Hilbert, as the only notable mathematician in the quartet, receives rather 
more attention.  In his case, we have to take it that he inspired the accent on 
formalisation, though the discussion thereof does not emphasise his work as one 
might have expected, given his ‘inspirational’ status.  Nor should it be thought that a 
single theoretical orientation prevails.  Indeed, one thing lacking is any consideration 
of the relationships between philosophy and history.  For example, some contributors 
want to move from a discussion of the growth of mathematical knowledge to the 
question of realism.  But it is arguable that a study of historical processes cannot help 
with this latter.  First, history studies datable, concrete processes, and second, the 
growth of mathematical knowledge falls within the scope of human experience.  To 
address the question of realism we have to ignore both these restrictions.  These 
considerations are not, as they stand, decisive.  They are offered here to suggest the 
sort of second-order issues that interdisciplinary research throws up. 
 The book lacks an index, but this and the other complaints mentioned here are 
minor.  There are very few typographical errors.  Authors do not seem to have been 
discouraged from including diagrams.  The print and paper are of high quality.  
Overall it is a rich and thought-provoking contribution to a relatively undeveloped 
area of research.  Indeed, the philosophy of the growth of mathematical knowledge 
has few canonical texts as yet.  This book may become one. 
